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LOSING ALL SENSE OF JUST 
PROPORTION: THE PECULIAR LAW OF 
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY 
MICHAEL HEYMAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
Complicity is the outlier of criminal law.  Representing an 
extraordinary use of state power, criminal law both condemns 
and punishes those who violate its norms.  To be a proper subject 
for that exercise of power, someone must engage in blameworthy 
conduct.  Nonetheless, complicity law, replete with statements 
that liability is derivative,1 imposes liability for another’s 
criminal conduct.  Accordingly, complicity law seems to violate 
the fundamental precept of personal wrongdoing as a predicate 
for punishment.  And, though it need not, in practice it has with 
terrible frequency. 
Worse perhaps, complicity law might undermine the very 
principle of legality that underpins the legal system.2  Following 
 
† Professor, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago). 
1 Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the 
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985). However, Professor 
Kadish is not responsible for this sometimes-doggerel assertion. He warns “not to 
misconstrue derivative liability as imparting vicarious liability,” indicating the 
necessity for finding “intentional action” by the accomplice that makes it appropriate 
to blame her. Id. 
2 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, ILL. CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE & 
REFORM COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE AND 
REFORM COMMISSION xxiii–xxiv (2003) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/illinois/IL%20final%20report%20Vol1.pdf  
The report stated: 
One of the critical functions of a criminal code is to provide notice to 
citizens of what conduct is prohibited. Indeed, the fundamental principle 
of legality — the requirement of a clear prior written prohibition as a 
prerequisite to criminal liability — underlies numerous constitutional 
and other core criminal-law rules, such as the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws and the constitutional invalidation of vague 
offenses. Providing notice also has obvious practical value, for citizens 
can hardly be expected to obey the law’s commands if they are unaware 
of them, or cannot understand them. 
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the Model Penal Code (the “Code”),3 many modern codes provide 
for accomplice liability for anyone who “aids or agrees or 
attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing” an 
offense.4  Such open-ended liability based on no clearly defined 
wrongful conduct seems to flout the notion that criminal laws 
must be precisely expressed to be valid and seems at odds with 
the otherwise staggering achievement of the Code regarding 
culpability. 
Confronting a hodge-podge of criminal laws from this 
country, the Code created a common lexicon and means for 
drafting criminal laws.  Rather than dealing with the oddities of 
malice, evil, or similar vague and arcane notions, the Code 
reduced the number of possible mental states to four and reduced 
the requirements to satisfy the commission of an act to three.5  
The Code paved the way not only for the drafting of more modern 
codes, but also for reconceptualizing criminal law to better serve 
its objectives. 
But the Code’s provision on accountability may be as vague 
and unworkable as then-existing law.  Rather than providing 
careful guidelines for what acts would suffice, it instead used 
broad terms such as “aids” and “attempts to aid.”6  Furthermore, 
it seemingly compounded problems by using that language to 
modify “in planning or committing” the offense.7  Thus, by 
rejecting the “baroque maze” of notions that pervaded the 
common law of complicity, the Code provided a streamlining that 
might have carried its own problems.8 
Perhaps this was inevitable.  Having committed to a unitary 
law of complicity, the drafters of the Code faced a dilemma of 
seemingly violating the careful work they had contributed to 
establishing reformed culpability law.  However, because the 
 
3 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART I §§ 1.01 to 2.13 
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) [hereinafter 1985 COMMENTARIES]; 
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART II §§ 210.0 to 213.6 (Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1980) [hereinafter 1980 COMMENTARIES]. 
4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
5 See id. § 2.02. Section 2.02 provides for purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and 
negligence. Id. Similarly, the same section indicates that these mental states should 
be carefully assigned to the conduct, results, or attendant circumstances confronting 
the criminal actor. Id. 
6 Id. § 2.06(3)(a)(ii). 
7 Id. 
8 Michael G. Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case 
Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 388, 390–91 (2010). 
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range of help available to accomplices is so great, and because 
the difficulties of determining the causal efficacy of such aid is so 
immense, the drafters had little choice but to create a law 
founding liability on intentional aid demonstrating the 
accomplice’s commitment to the criminal ends of the primary 
actor.9 
Unfortunately, these obvious difficulties of cabining 
accomplice law were exacerbated by a parallel development in 
the law.  Most states still find the accomplice liable not only for 
the assisted offense, but for those that are committed as a 
“natural and probable consequence” of the commission of the 
target offense.10  In fact, some have adopted this position despite 
having codified the Code position on complicity.11  Thus, the 
often-tenuous connection between the direct actor and his 
accomplice is further attenuated, as he now shares responsibility 
for conduct in which he has neither engaged nor intentionally 
 
9 The Code had, after all, required that the accomplice provide that aid “with 
the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.” MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
10 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 475 (6th ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING]; see also Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 
U.S. 183, 190 (2007). In that case, the parties presented a virtual fifty state survey 
on complicity law, with the respondent arguing against the legitimacy of this 
doctrine. Nevertheless, reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Breyer said, “few 
jurisdictions (only 10 in Duenas–Alvarez’s own view) have expressly rejected the 
‘natural and probable consequences’ doctrine. Moreover, many States and the 
Federal Government apply some form or variation of that doctrine, or permit jury 
inferences of intent in circumstances similar to those in which California has applied 
the doctrine, as explained below.” Id. at 190–91 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). Indeed, even the respondent admitted that many states apply the doctrine 
in the face of conflicting statutes or decisional law. Brief for Respondent at 17, 
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (No. 05-1629). 
As LaFave has explained: “The established rule, as it is usually stated by courts and 
commentators, is that accomplice liability extends to acts of the principal in the first 
degree which were a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the criminal scheme the 
accomplice encouraged or aided.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 725 (5th ed. 
2010) (citation omitted). Indeed, LaFave pointed out that recent codifications also 
adopt this position. Id. at 726. 
11 See generally Heyman, supra note 8. As that piece discusses, Illinois has, 
rather sadly, codified this notion under the rubric of “common design.” Thus, the 
Code provision sits side-by-side with this wholly conflicting one. See 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c) (West 2012) (“When 2 or more persons engage in a common 
criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design 
committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common 
design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those 
further acts.”). Sadly, this development is consistent with LaFave’s observations 
about the durability of this doctrine. See LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 725–27. 
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assisted.  Whatever flimsy connection might ordinarily tie the 
two together in criminality would seem to be gone; yet liability 
still attaches, taking complicity liability beyond the breaking 
point. 
Mindful of the presence of this doctrine, the Code repudiated 
it, expressly distancing itself from it.  From its perspective, the 
natural and probable consequence doctrine was both 
“incongruous and unjust.”12  The thinking was simple:  
Predicating liability on foreseeability seemingly establishes 
negligence as the mental state for the accomplice, though more is 
required to convict the primary actor.  That inverts things 
unacceptably.  Because of the ambiguous nature of the 
accomplice’s conduct, the dangers of convicting an innocent 
person are so great that, if anything, the law should require a 
greater mental state for the accomplice as opposed to the primary 
actor.13 
Thus, however mindless this foreseeability doctrine, it has 
substantial traction.  Its injustice should not go unnoticed, but 
repudiation on any large scale will take some doing.  Advancing 
that objective requires a reappraisal of complicity law generally 
to see the harms wrought by this doctrine.  This Article first 
examines the development of complicity law, noting its common 
law origins.  The Model Penal Code has streamlined the law, but 
this is not evident until we recognize the maze of terms and 
concepts that preceded it.  Thus, I point out the complex, but 
flawed, categories of actors that existed at common law and the 
significance of the accomplice’s location and temporal 
relationship to the criminal event. 
Second, I show the harm wrought by this natural and 
probable consequence, or common design, doctrine.  Magnifying 
the problematic issues of general complicity law, it extends 
accomplice liability to establish a form of guilt by association 
totally at odds with civilized notions of criminal liability.  Here, 
an examination of the problems of one state, Illinois, exemplifies 
this unfortunate turn in the law and represents the general 
pathology of criminal law development.  The thinking of the Code 
has been entirely subverted in this terribly critical area. 
 
12 1985 COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, § 2.06 at 312 n.42. 
13 Id. 
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I then examine the theoretical constructs of any notion of 
complicity, as well as the predominant thinking of several critics.  
Criticism is nearly pointless without an attempt to replace bad 
doctrine with something preferable, and the chief thinkers in this 
area have tried to do just that.  Thus, some have sought to infuse 
substantial notions of causal contribution into complicity law,14 
while others find causal analysis better applied to the laws of 
nature than to those governing human conduct.15  I find all such 
approaches misguided; they treat complicity law as if it is a 
quagmire from which we can emerge, by simply creating better 
theory that properly assigns blame and captures the dynamic of 
the accomplice-primary actor relationship.  As explained the 
variety and forms of accomplice assistance rule out the 
imposition of any grand theory upon this area. 
Instead, we have to examine the ends of criminal law and fit 
accomplice liability within them.  Accordingly, I bring complicity 
law within a system based on individual culpability: a system 
that condemns and punishes based on the actor’s personal 
commitment to the criminal objective.  The Code did this with its 
inclusion of the term “attempts to aid” and its other provisions on 
complicity, and we should recognize the limits of any attempt to 
substantially improve upon that basic construct. 
I. COMPLICITY LAW: ORIGINS AND ACTORS 
Complicity law can be a real “jaw-dropper” for the 
uninitiated.16  In a recent article, Joshua Dressler recounted a 
rather remarkable story from The New York Times17 concerning a 
nineteen-year-old boy sentenced to ten years in prison as an 
accomplice to a drug sale.18  However, rather than acting in any 
traditional capacity, the teenager had acted as a translator for a 
 
14 Joshua Dressler has done this on a few occasions. See Joshua Dressler, 
Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 427, 447 (2008) (“A person is not accountable for the actions of the 
perpetrator unless her assistance not only satisfies the causation requirement but 
there is evidence that the accomplice was a substantial participant, not a bit player, 
in the multi-party crime.”). 
15 Kadish, supra note 1, at 360 (“Sine qua non in the physical causation sense, 
therefore, does not exist in any account of human actions.”). 
16 Lawyer Tells Youths of Drug Deal Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998 at 19. 
17 See Dressler, supra note 14, at 429 n.5 (citing Lawyer Tells Youths of Drug 
Deal Risks, supra note 16. 
18 Lawyer Tells Youths of Drug Deal Risks, supra note 16. 
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Spanish-speaking friend in the drug deal.19  Thus, a teenager, 
who held a full-time job and had never had any previous brushes 
with the law, received a ten-year sentence in a federal 
penitentiary with no possibility of parole.20  Yet, for all we know, 
that teenager was simply with a friend who made the purchase 
and, when asked, translated a few words here and there. 
This is no one-time horror tale.  By placing the primary actor 
on the same footing as the accomplice, complicity law treats them 
equally for all purposes.21  Naturally, that is not in the least 
confined to drug offenses.  One well-known legal chestnut deals 
with the unfortunate reporter who hailed the arrival of a 
prominent jazz musician for his performance at the Princes 
Theatre in London.22  Apparently the artist, Coleman Hawkins, 
was prohibited from employment in the United Kingdom, a fact 
presumably known to the reporter, Herbert Wilcox.  Thus, the 
court found his paid presence at the concert the basis for his 
liability as an accomplice to Hawkins and nothing more was 
required.23 
Indeed, explaining the basis for his liability, the court said 
that he was “present, taking part, concurring, or encouraging, 
whichever word you like to use for expressing this conception.” 24  
But which words are used does matter.  It matters a great deal.  
The court was unconcerned with whether Wilcox in any way 
communicated with Hawkins.  Moreover, it is not even clear 
what was being approved of or encouraged: musical artistry or a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United Kingdom.  Similarly, 
the court was equally indifferent to precisely when Hawkins’ 
offense took place, and thus, whether Wilcox could even have 
caused it, at this point.  What we have then is criminal liability 
in one who undoubtedly did not cause the criminal conduct and 
was simply one of many in an appreciative audience at that 
concert. 
 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 The potential for sympathetic sentencing is frequently possible, but not in 
that setting given the mandatory nature of the applicable drug sentences. 
22 Wilcox v. Jeffery, (1951) 1 All E.R. 464 (K.B.) (U.K.). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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But as foolish as this result seems, it is equally foolish to 
abolish complicity entirely as a legal notion.25  Though criminal 
liability attaches to the actor who engages directly in the 
prohibited act, others can play roles of varying degrees of 
involvement, leading up to that conduct.  And that is just the 
problem: determining what counts as involvement sufficient to 
implicate criminal liability for the accomplice, without losing all 
sense of just proportion.26 
A. Common Law Approaches and Comparative Insights 
Though crimes may frequently be the product of individual 
action, some may require more participants.  Some, by their 
nature, require different people performing different tasks.  The 
classic cases come from conspiracy law, where engaging 
metaphors have been used to depict the nature of the 
conspiratorial relationship, its party dimension.  For example, 
the case of United States v. Bruno27 strained this metaphoric 
rendering of conspiratorial relationships. 
In Bruno, eighty-eight defendants were charged with a 
single conspiracy “to import, sell and possess narcotics.”28  The 
group consisted of smugglers, middlemen, and two groups of 
retailers selling to addicts in New York, Texas, and Louisiana.29  
Invoking the famous images of the chain and the wheel, the court 
recognized the interdependence of the different types of groups 
extending as a veritable criminal chain and the relationship of 
the retailers at the end to the middlemen as spokes in a wheel in 
which the middlemen served as hubs.30  However inapt those 
 
25 See Commonwealth v. Vieira, 519 N.E.2d 1320 (Mass. 1988). That case 
involved a rape that took place at a bar viewed by sixteen customers (many cheering 
and laughing) and a bartender, none of whom helped the victim. Id. at 1321. That 
event was poignantly depicted in the 1988 movie The Accused, starring Jodie Foster. 
See THE ACCUSED (Paramount Pictures 1988). 
26 Rejecting membership in a conspiracy as a per se basis for accomplice 
liability, the Code commentary anchored liability in the conduct of the would-be 
accomplice. Indeed, warning against a per se approach it said: “law would lose all 
sense of just proportion if simply because of the conspiracy itself each were held 
accountable for thousands of additional offenses of which he was completely 
unaware and which he did not influence at all.” 1985 COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, 
§ 2.06 at 307. 
27 105 F.2d 921, 922–23 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). 
28 Id. at 922. 
29 Id. 
30 See id. at 922–23 (discussing the relationship of distribution between the 
smugglers, middlemen, and retailers). 
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depictions, they did manage to capture the complex relationships 
necessary to achieve the ultimate objective of the extremely 
profitable sale of narcotics on the streets. 
Complicity differs from conspiracy, but conspiracy is 
obviously an agreement to do something, and both involve multi-
party criminal enterprises.31 Though the codefendants in Bruno 
stood on equal criminal footing despite their disparate roles, 
complicity law has shown real ambivalence about the very basis 
for a party’s linkage to the completed offense.  In both complicity 
and conspiracy we have multiple parties and concerted actions, 
and while complicity inherently requires more of the would-be 
accomplice, the issue has often become of “what” do we “need” 
more. 
Dressler, in a central article, sought to find that missing 
ingredient.32  There, he considered the relative strengths of the 
various theories supporting accomplice liability and, indeed, 
whether all parties should be punished equally.  Focusing on the 
“hegemony test,” he considered the liability of the brains behind 
a bank robbery that, nevertheless, had little control over the 
other participants.33  In his example, the brains might consist of 
a skilled electrician who had the know-how to disable the alarm 
system.34  Yet, under the hegemony test, the “brains” would be 
exempt from full punishment, something that offends our moral 
intuitions about blame and punishment.35 
At least the act hegemony approach has the virtue of 
predicating punishment on a person’s level of involvement in an 
offense, contrasting dramatically with the somewhat simple-
minded common law approaches.  The common law constructed 
accomplice liability upon the two axies of time and location, and 
thus, based liability on the categories into which the actors fell. 
 
31 Conspiracy is an inchoate offense usually requiring little conduct beyond the 
agreement. By contrast, complicity obviously requires the commission on an offense. 
32 Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice 
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 92–93 (1985). 
33 Id. at 124. 
34 Id. 
35 To Dressler, this approach “goes too far in permitting leniency” as it “excludes 
from full punishment too many actors, even as it generally ensures that those who 
are fully punished deserve it.” Id. 
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Under the common law, actors were categorized as principals 
or accessories.36  The major actor was the “principal in the first 
degree,” often and understandably thought of as the real 
perpetrator.37  Simply put, he performed the crime in the most 
conventional sense, satisfying both the act and mental state 
requirements personally, or through another whom he 
controlled.38  Absent other actors, we think of him as the criminal 
actor. 
But, as crimes are often the product of concerted action, 
there was a need to deal with the others who played some roles 
in committing crimes.  The common law could have simply 
rejected the idea of accomplice liability, but in embracing it, the 
coomon law had to somehow define the types of roles played by 
more indirect players.  The next type of actor is the “principal in 
the second degree.”39  Here, potentially separated from the crime 
by both time and location, the actor in the second degree 
nevertheless played some sort of role in assisting the chief actor.  
Yet it is problematic to attenuate criminality through this party 
as, by definition, she has not committed the actus reus of the 
offense.  That’s where the common law started to get bogged 
down, as by extending liability beyond the perpetrator, it now 
had to confront the question of just what others had to do to 
deserve punishment. 
Thus, though this party did not have to be present,40 he did 
have to provide some form of assistance or encouragement, 
whereby it seemed fitting to hold him liable.  So, for example, 
though we think of Dressler’s expert electrician as a principal in 
the second degree for the early, though significant, role he played 
in the heist, as we will see, he would not count.  Rather,  
 
 
36 For a fuller development of this scheme, see DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, 
supra note 10, at 460–61. 
37 Id. at 460. 
38 See id. at 460–61. The Code wound up dealing with this issue of manipulation 
through its notion of the innocent instrumentality. See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.06(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). It provided that one is responsible for the 
acts of another if she has the “culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the 
offense, [and] [s]he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such 
conduct.” Id. 
39 DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 10, at 462.  
40 The perpetrator was deemed to be constructively present. And as Dressler 
points out, a person is constructively present if “he is situated in a position to assist 
the principal in the first degree during the commission of the crime.” Id. 
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paradigms for complicity consisted of those who served as 
lookouts, getaway drivers and others who played functional roles 
in the criminal venture. 
That skilled electrician would, instead, be characterized as 
an “accessory before the fact.”  As the law developed, that party 
was neither actually nor constructively present, but rather 
played some role in the pre-crime setting.  Additionally, because 
of that separation from the crime, she was frequently considered 
less blameworthy than the other parties. 
Finally, the “accessory after the fact” played an odd role in 
this scheme.  Often, the accessory existed solely to obscure the 
commission of the offense or shield the other actors from 
detection.  Despite that, however, for some time he was regarded 
as derivatively liable for the crimes already committed.  
Fortunately, this has changed, as now virtually all jurisdictions 
regard his conduct as separate and apart from the original 
offense, thus constituting a new crime.41 
But over time the drawbacks of this scheme became clear, as 
liability hinged on the when and where of what one did, rather 
than on either the causal efficacy of her conduct or her degree of 
involvement in the criminal venture.  However, this is not the 
only approach taken by criminal codes. 
1. The German Approach to Complicity 
German law represents an instructive departure from this 
approach.  It shares the common law inclination to base 
complicity on one’s distinctive role, but substantially redefines 
each role.  Whereas the common law regarded time and place as 
critical, the German approach is based on one’s functional role in 
the crime’s commission.  By its approach, there are five types of 
criminal actors:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 Id. at 463. 
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First, there is the direct perpetrator (unmittelbarer Täter).42  
This is obvious, and tracks the thinking of the MPC.43  Here, 
there is obviously no issue of imputing conduct to another, for the 
direct perpetrator has directly engaged in the criminal act. 
Next, the German scheme has recognized the indirect 
perpetrator (mittelbarer Täter), a party described by one 
commentator as one who “uses another as an unwitting or 
unwilling tool to engage in the proscribed conduct.”44  This, too, 
finds an analogue in the Code, in that it also recognizes the need 
to codify this approach, lest someone escape liability behind this 
subterfuge.45 
Finally, still dealing with the criminal conduct of the offense 
itself, German law recognizes a co-perpetrator (Mittätter),46 one 
who jointly engages in the prohibited conduct with the direct 
perpetrator.  However, it is here that German law may be 
puzzling, since it regards some forms of accomplice contribution 
as being of equal blameworthiness with that of the acts of the 
direct perpetrator and thus conflates their roles.  Thus, so long as 
the co-perpetrator agrees upon a common plan with the direct 
actor and acts upon that, he is equally blameworthy.47 
Here the German approach parted ways with the common 
law.  Though the common law distinguished between actors 
based on a temporal scheme, the Germans gave no weight to 
that.  Here, this approach more closely represents that of the  
 
 
 
 
 
42 Markus D. Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis, 5 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 977, 979 (2007). 
43 Recall that section 2.06 begins by stating “[a] person is guilty of an offense if 
it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he 
is legally accountable, or both.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962). 
44 Dubber, supra note 42. (illuminating contrast of the common law and German 
schemes). 
45 Again, the Code assigns liability so long as “acting with the kind of culpability 
that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or 
irresponsible person to engage in such conduct.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
46 Dubber, supra note 42. 
47 See Kai Hamdorf, The Concept of a Joint Criminal Enterprise and Domestic 
Modes of Liability for Parties to a Crime: A Comparison of German and English Law, 
5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 208, 212 (2007). 
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Code, basing accomplice liability on the “aid” lent to the criminal 
venture.48  Nonetheless, the German approach is both puzzling 
and unique hereafter. 
Having recognized three categories of perpetrators, it then 
has two distinct and different categories, roughly corresponding 
to accessories.  First is the solicitor (Anstifter).49  That is someone 
who incites or encourages another to engage in the criminal 
conduct.  Though we might expect him to be punished more 
lightly than the principals, that is not so.50  However, mitigated 
punishment is provided for the fifth and last category of actor 
under German law. 
The facilitator (Gehilfe) is someone who only aids another in 
committing the act, though he is not treated as a perpetrator.51  
Indeed, he receives a mandatory punishment discount under 
German law, presumably because his assistance reflects a lesser 
involvement in the criminal enterprise.52  This clearly parts ways 
with the Model Penal Code and signals a critical theme in 
German accomplice law: the significance of Tatherrschaft, 
something roughly translated as act dominion.53  Thus, the 
borderline distinction between co-perpetrator and facilitator 
under German law would be resolved by determining whether 
one had Tatherrschaft, a distinction particularly bewildering as it 
is unhinged to presence.  One can be present and not have it, yet 
absent and still have Tatherrschaft.54  And, as explained, 
substantial punishment mitigation may hinge on this factor. 
On its face, the German categorical approach seems 
preferable to its common law counterparts, as it distinguishes the 
participants on a more precise, functional basis, and levies 
punishments differently between the principals and the 
 
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). There, you are 
an accomplice if, “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 
offense” one “aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or 
committing it.” Id. § 2.06(3)(a). 
49 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] § 26 (Ger.), available at http://dejure.org/ 
gesetze/StGB/26.html. 
50 See id. § 25. 
51 Id. § 27. 
52 Section 49 of the code specifies special mitigating circumstances. For example, 
were the principal actor to receive imprisonment for life, the facilitator would receive 
not fewer than three years. See id. § 49(1). 
53 Dubber, supra note 42, at 981. 
54 See id. at 982. 
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facilitator.  And, perhaps it is preferable.  However, the 
semblance of tidiness proved somewhat illusory, as the scholars 
and courts in Germany have wrestled with a different approach 
to complicity.55  This formal, objective theory was in tension with 
a more subjective approach, one based on this notion of 
Tatherrschaft.  Clearly analogous to what Dressler called act 
hegemony, this notion brings us back to the idea that the 
categorical approach does not always align perfectly with our 
intuitions of blameworthiness and proper punishment. 
Under this evolving theory, parties should be classified 
according to their control over the actus reus of the crime.  But 
the ambiguity of that view has been recognized, and German 
courts have further refined this notion, recognizing three 
distinctive kinds of control:  First, the actor may control the 
action itself (Handlungsherrschaft).56  Second, he may exercise 
control over the volitional controls of another 
(Willensherrschaft).57  Finally, he may exercise control over the 
functional aspects of the crime (funktionale Tatherrschaft).58 
Now the complexities and tensions with the German law are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  However, German law recognizes 
the need to both categorize actors, yet also show some flexibility 
of approach to serve the overarching objective of adjusting the 
criminal law to ferret out the worst actors and apportion blame 
accordingly.  Indeed, comparing the two systems, Professor 
Dubber concluded not only that the similarities vastly outweigh 
the differences, but also that they shared the common 
commitment to reject any notion of guilt by association.59  As 
Dubber said, “Most important, both systems are committed to 
complying with the general principle that criminal liability 
requires that each defendant — perpetrator and accomplice alike 
— satisfy each element of the offence as statutorily defined.”60  
However, this statement is only partially true. 
 
55 See Hamdorf, supra note 47, at 210. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. See generally CARL ERIK HERLITZ, PARTIES TO A CRIME AND THE NOTION 
OF A COMPLICITY OBJECT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ALTERNATIVES PROVIDED 
BY THE MODEL PENAL CODE, SWEDISH LAW AND CLAUS ROXIN 279–81 (1992) 
(discussing funktionale Tatherrschaft as cases of co-perpetration). 
59 Dubber, supra note 42, at 978. 
60 Id. 
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The natural and probable consequences doctrine61 dispenses 
with all need to prove any mental state for the accomplice.  If the 
second offense is regarded as a natural consequence of the first, 
an accomplice to the first offense is automatically liable for the 
second.  Remarkably, this doctrine has withstood the adoption of 
the Code in some states,62 as it has been nurtured as a judicially 
created notion to which the judiciary has clung stubbornly.  An 
examination of this doctrine reveals its dangers and serious 
subversion of sensible doctrine. 
II. NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 
The story of the translator’s liability and ten-year sentence is 
disconcerting.  But is it so inevitably wrong?  We do not know, 
and that is precisely the point.  We do not know what the boy did, 
nor can we conclude anything from the mere fact of their 
friendship.  For example, it may be that the translator was 
walking with his friend, by chance they happened upon the 
dealer, he translated a few words when asked, and that was it.  
Absent any predefined relationship involving the sale or 
purchase of drugs, the translator’s involvement may have been 
utterly minimal, spontaneous, and fleeting. 
That is not the only possibility.  It might also be that the boy 
regularly served as a translator, frequently playing a key role in 
facilitating the sale and purchase of drugs.  Were that the case, 
the poignant appeal of the story would disappear.  And it would 
disappear because he was directly involved in the proscribed 
conduct, though only acting in a secondary capacity.  Moreover, 
his choice to participate would then be clear, and his liability 
would be based upon his own conduct.  But by either scenario, he 
was involved in the drug transaction. 
But now imagine a changed situation, one in which he 
accompanied some friends to a house where drugs were 
purchased.  Imagine further that he knew a sale was in the offing 
as he waited outside, but that things went terribly wrong inside 
during the transaction, and his friends were charged with 
attempted murder of the other boys, having fired some shots at 
 
61 Or, as I have said and it is sometimes known, the “Common Design doctrine.” 
62 However, as I have said, apparently ten states have rejected this doctrine 
explicitly. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 10, at 475 n.95. At the same 
time, states such as Illinois maintain that doctrine along with the obviously 
conflicting Code version of complicity. 
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them.  Finally, imagine that the shots were fired with guns 
wrested by them from the others, as they were initially unarmed 
at the time of the encounter.  In that setting, a conviction could 
easily be obtained against him for the attempted murders—as 
well as the others, naturally—using the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine.  But why? 
Crime is a compound concept, requiring the actor to engage 
in the proscribed conduct with the requisite mental state.63  
Many modern codes reflect this and, frequently following the 
Model Penal Code, specify this clearly.64  Indeed, demonstrating 
repugnance at the idea of strict liability, the Code specifically 
requires proof of culpability absent a clear demonstration that 
strict liability was intended.65  Finally, these very requirements 
are repeated in both the Code and state codes, in their sections 
on complicity.  By dispensing with the requirements of personal 
wrongdoing, this natural and probable doctrine undercuts this 
clear requirement of personal liability.  The doctrine has arisen 
out of an odd interplay between legislatures and courts, one in 
which courts have shown a common law bias at odds with 
modern code law. 
This bias would ensnare our young translator, as courts have 
frequently ignored the niceties of code law, in favor of intuitive 
perceptions of justice.66  By that view, having thrown in with his 
 
63 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
64 For example, the Illinois Code rearranges the MPC sections, but provides that 
“[a] person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct 
is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable 
for such conduct as provided in Section 5-2, or both.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-
1 (West 2012). That code then literally compounds things, by providing that a 
voluntary act is a “material element of every offense” and no one is guilty of an 
offense, other than one involving strict liability, unless she possesses the mental 
state prescribed for the offense. Id. at 5/4–1, 5/4–3. 
65 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Moreover, 
section 2.02(3) requires proof of purpose, knowledge or recklessness if the relevant 
law does not prescribe the culpability involved. Id. § 2.02(3). Again, state codes, such 
as that of Illinois, clearly oppose any presumption of strict liability and impose the 
same proof in the face of legislative silence. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b), 
5/4-9. 
66 See James R. Thompson et al., The Illinois Criminal Code of 2009: Providing 
Clarity in the Law, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 815, 818 (2008) (explaining how the 
achievements of the CLEAR Commission and the Code changed resulting from the 
authors’ efforts). Commenting on the newly-codified Common Design rule, the 
authors characterized the rule as having been consistently applied by the Illinois 
Supreme Court “for over one hundred and fifty years.” Id. at 823. And although they 
lauded the rule as being consistent with the existing statute, that position is 
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friends, the boy bore responsibility for their illegal conduct that 
grew out of the drug deal.  But though that cannot be supported 
by any cognizable criminal law theory, the origins and tenor of 
complicity law reveal a real doctrinal ambivalence.  Part of the 
body of criminal law deals with multiple parties and their 
acquiescence in the conduct of others.  Thus, it resists neat 
classification, partially about representational relationships, it 
draws simultaneously from criminal law as well as doctrines 
from agency law. 
Commentators as varied as Francis Sayre and George 
Fletcher have noticed this ambivalence.67  Writing well before the 
modern code era, Sayre discussed complicity within the context of 
the agency rule of respondeat superior.68  The similarities are 
obvious, as in both settings someone has acquiesced in being 
represented by another.  Indeed, as Sayre notes, “even if the 
particular criminal act has not been authorized or consented to, if 
it grows out of and is the proximate consequence of one that has 
been authorized or procured,” the defendant is justly liable.69  
But Sayre drew the line at what he called “true crimes,” as “it is 
of the very essence of our deep-rooted notions of criminal liability 
that guilt be personal and individual.”70 
Similarly, Fletcher, bemoaning this theoretical incoherence, 
called for reconceptualizing this criminal relationship to capture 
the person most deserving of serious punishment.71  
Unquestionably, however extralegal it is, courts frequently lump 
together the accomplice to the original offense with the principal  
 
 
 
untenable. See Heyman, supra note 8, at 390–91 (explaining how the “principal in 
the second degree” can be one who was not physically present or who provided 
assistance). 
67 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 
HARV. L. REV. 689, 689–90 (1930) (discussing how different systems of law have 
reached varying solutions for the relationship of master or principal and servant or 
agent); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 664 (Oxford U. Press 
2000) (1978) (describing the ambivalence as a result of deciding “whether criminal 
law is similar to or different from the private law of agency”). 
68 This is the familiar notion whereby the master is liable for even the wrongful 
conduct of his servants. See Sayre, supra note 67, at 690. 
69 Id. at 703–04. 
70 Id. at 717. 
71 FLETCHER, supra note 67, at 660. It should also be observed that Fletcher 
preferred the sophistication of the German system, especially the parts calling for 
differentiated punishments. See id. at 659. 
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actor under this natural and probable view, despite dramatic—
and, you would think, obvious—differences in culpability.  And, 
in many cases, they do so claiming statutory support. 
A. The Odd Law of Common Design 
Pity poor Rudy Kessler.  A man in the wrong place at the 
wrong time found himself charged with two counts of attempted 
murder for sitting in a car and waiting for his friends to return.72  
Kessler and two friends had spent some time carousing, when 
one mentioned that he needed to “ ‘put his hands on’ $1800.”73  
Kessler mentioned that he had worked at a bar in Rockford, 
Illinois not long ago, but that the receipts have rarely been that 
large.74  Nonetheless, the other two decided to head off toward 
the bar, to see what they could find. 
Entering after closing, they found more than they bargained 
for.  Though unarmed, they got into a scuffle with the bar owner 
who had returned to inspect the premises, found a pistol behind 
the bar, and shot him in the neck.75  Fleeing the scene, they also 
fired several shots at pursuing state police.76  Eventually run off 
the road, they were arrested and ultimately charged with one 
count of burglary and two counts of attempted murder.77  Thus 
far, Kessler’s conduct is strongly reminiscent of our translator’s.  
Hanging around with the wrong guys, he found himself in 
trouble almost entirely of their making.  Yet, because of their 
close association, he faced identical criminal liability though the 
applicable code seemed to preclude this result. 
Convicted on two counts of attempted murder, Kessler 
argued that the Code barred such a result.  Specifically, he 
argued that intent to kill was wholly lacking, without which 
there could be no attempted murder.  Though he was successful  
 
 
 
 
72 People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 30 (Ill. 1974). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. For the appellate opinion detailing those facts, see People v. Kessler, 296 
N.E.2d 631, 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 
75 Kessler, 315 N.E.2d at 31. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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at the appellate level, the state Supreme Court disagreed.78  In 
that court, the common law bias easily overcame the clear 
mandate of the statute. 
Largely ignoring Kessler’s argument, the court focused on 
the meaning of the word “conduct” within the state accountability 
statutes.79  The language is critically important, it provided that: 
“[a] person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an 
offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of 
another and he is legally accountable for such conduct.”80  
Thereafter, it set out the predicates for accomplice liability, 
namely intentional aid in the commission of the target offense.81 
As the Illinois scheme closely followed the Model Penal Code, 
it also provided definitions of critical terms such as “voluntary 
act” and “conduct.”  At the time, Illinois defined “conduct” as “a 
series of acts, and the accompanying mental state.”82  Again, 
sweeping aside the mental state requirement, the court agreed 
with the state’s argument that conduct included all of the acts of 
the wrongdoer:   
We believe the statute, as it reads, means that where one aids 
another in the planning or commission of an offense, he is 
legally accountable for the conduct of the person he aids; and 
that the word ‘conduct’ encompasses any criminal act done in 
furtherance of the planned and intended act.83   
The court applied a bludgeon to this carefully crafted statutory 
scheme, forcing a doctrine upon it that plainly did not fit. 
 
 
78 The appellate court rather reluctantly agreed with Kessler, concluding that 
“[i]mputed or implied intent [was] clearly outside the contemplation of the statute on 
accountability,” though the common design rule was a “more reasonable approach to 
the law of accountability but one which [the court could not] adopt in contravention 
of the language in the Code.” Kessler, 296 N.E.2d at 636, 636 n.3. 
79 Note that both the Illinois Code and the Model Penal Code premise guilt on 
one’s intentional connection to the conduct of another for whom he is legally 
accountable. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-1 (West 2012). However, I say the court ignored his 
argument because it focused solely on the act component of the statute, ignoring the 
mens rea issue entirely. 
80 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-1 (emphasis added). 
81 Id. at 5/5–2. 
82 Kessler, 315 N.E.2d at 32 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 2-4 (1971)) 
(current version at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-4). 
83 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The term “conduct” in the accountability section was plainly 
linked to “an element of” the target offense.84  Through that 
mechanism, someone who has not directly committed the 
criminal act is liable nevertheless, provided that he afforded 
intentional assistance in its commission.  That scheme does not 
accommodate common design—or its generic sibling, natural and 
probable)—as guilt requires this linkage to each crime, one by 
one.  Thus, had Kessler been present at the time of the shootings 
and, for example, provided a weapon upon demand, he could have 
been guilty.  However, passively sitting unaware of these events 
in the car outside of the bar, he could not remotely be found 
guilty.  Yet of course, he was.85  Worse, he was sentenced to five 
to fifteen years on each count of attempted murder.86 
Because of the crudity of this court’s reasoning, it did 
nothing to delineate any contours for accomplice liability.  
Without even examining what is meant by “common design,” it 
nevertheless found that they had one, and that was the sole basis 
for Kessler’s guilt.87  Thus, we are back to our translator who is 
unlucky enough to be linked to those who expand the criminal 
venture, and we are without any guidance for assessing his 
individual guilt.  But that was 1974, barely a decade into the new 
Code law.  Yet, unfortunately, matters have only worsened. 
B. Parallel Courses, Opposite Directions 
The discussion here about German developments and 
scholarly discussion in American journals would seem to bode 
well for law’s progress in America.  It may be just the opposite:  
As German jurisprudence refines this notion of act dominion and 
as American scholars wrestle with fundamental questions about 
complicity law, courts and legislatures often proceed unfazed 
by—and unaware of—these inquiries.88  Were act dominion the 
 
84 Id. at 31. 
85 Perhaps even more telling of this notion of guilt by association was that the 
court went on to attempt to buttress its finding by citing to both Nineteenth Century 
case law—clearly inapplicable to the Code)—and felony murder jurisprudence; the 
latter authority is particularly inappropriate, as felony murder provides its own 
principle of liability as a strict liability doctrine. Id. at 32. 
86 See People v. Kessler, 296 N.E.2d 631, 633 (Ill. Ct. App. 1973). 
87 See Kessler, 315 N.E.2d at 31–32. 
88 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code 
Second Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169 (2003). There, 
Robinson and Cahill bemoan the amendment cycles experienced by post 1960s and 
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touchstone for accomplice liability, liability would turn on a 
potentially long, highly detailed factual inquiry into a party’s 
conduct.  As it is, courts have done just the opposite, reciting 
empty platitudes that have only lead to this judicially created 
mess. 
Following the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Kessler,89 
that Court’s view was embodied in the pattern jury instructions 
used by various trial judges.90  Such instructions provide the 
blueprint for the instructions given to juries and are often given 
verbatim.  Here are the instructions on accountability:   
  A person is legally responsible for the conduct of another 
person when, either before or during the commission of an 
offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate the 
commission of [an] offense, he knowingly solicits, aids, abets, 
agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in the 
planning or commission of [an] offense. 
  [The word “conduct” includes any criminal act done in 
furtherance of the planned and intended act.] 91   
Finally, the Pattern Jury Instructions provide that “[i]ntent 
to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense may be 
shown by evidence that the defendant shared a criminal intent of 
the principal or evidence that there was a common criminal 
design.”92  Performing a sleight-of-hand, whereby association 
with the principal becomes the basis for accomplice liability, 
courts have charted a course for disaster. 
Common design has been used as an expedient to avoid 
having to prove an accomplice’s guilt for subsequent offenses; it 
operates automatically.93  But its core precept, open-ended 
liability for the misconduct of one’s cohorts, can lead to its 
 
1970s Codes. Regarding those amendments as almost inevitably leading to code 
degradations, they examine a major engine driving those developments: the “news-
story/political-response cycle.” Id. at 170. The Illinois amendments discussed here 
provide a particularly painful example of code degradation. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/5-2 (West 2012). 
89 Kessler, 315 N.E.2d at 30. 
90 See, e.g., ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 5.03 (4th ed. 2011). 
91 Id. I have chosen the word “an” as provided for in these instructions in the 
case of a multi-crime setting. 
92 Id. (emphasis added). Note also that this instruction dispenses with the need 
to prove the mental state of the accused. Moreover, since the so-called “common 
design” participant is responsible for the conduct of others, the instructions also 
eliminate the need to prove his wrongful acts. See Heyman, supra note 8, at 409. 
93 Naturally, since “common design” is just a local name for natural and 
probable, anything said of the one is true for the other. 
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expansion even beyond these malign uses.  For example, imagine 
two street gangs involved in a violent conflict where someone was 
shot, but not killed.  Imagine further that it can only be proven 
that the shots came from one of several boys even though formal 
ballistic tests were performed.  It would seem, then, that charges 
against any person would fail, as it cannot be determined who 
shot the victim.  Naturally, this is not the case. 
People v. Cooper94 illustrated such a situation.  That case 
examined the unsightly spectacle of the clash between two street 
gangs, the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples, which 
resulted in the killing of one gang member and the serious 
wounding of another on the streets of Chicago.95  On appeal to 
the state supreme court, defendants claimed that the failure to 
identify which one shot the victim prevents either from being 
designated the principal, thus ruling out any potential 
accountability.96  The court disagreed.97 
First, the court cited the too-familiar shibboleth of common 
design, indicating the joint responsibility parties bear for the acts 
of all.98  It then proceeded to enlarge that rule to affirm the 
conviction in this case.  The language used is critical:  “Evidence 
that a defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on 
illegal acts with knowledge of its design supports an inference 
that he shared the common purpose and will sustain his 
conviction for an offense committed by another.”99  The breadth of 
this language is staggering, as is its sentiment.  This would seem 
to make mere membership in a gang a sufficient basis for guilt 
for anything done by any member.  Taken seriously, this is a 
total and impermissible rewrite of the accountability statute. 
However, since liability hinges on sharing of a common 
purpose, the court then explained what counts as sharing:  “A 
conviction under accountability does not require proof of a 
preconceived plan if the evidence indicates involvement by the 
accused in the spontaneous acts of the group.”100  This is scarcely 
the language of criminal law at all.  The predicate conduct by the 
defendant is “involvement,” and the very notion of the need for a 
 
94 743 N.E.2d 32 (Ill. 2000). 
95 Id. at 36. 
96 Id. at 41. 
97 Id. at 42. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
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“common plan” is undercut by the denial of any need for a plan at 
all, whereby association with “spontaneous” conduct cements the 
defendant’s relationship to both the group and its objectives.  
Despite the odd references here to communities of unlawful 
purpose, guilt was not based on any community of effort.101  On 
the contrary, guilt was based on the defendant’s presence, that 
he fired shots and that someone from this group, known or 
unknown to him, with or without his help, shot the victim. 
All traditional doctrine has been jettisoned in favor of a 
position that can only yield guilt.  Indeed, the court virtually 
concedes this in its parting comments on this issue, citing to the 
view that “accountability may be established through a person’s 
knowledge of and participation in the criminal scheme, even 
though there is no evidence that he directly participated in the 
criminal act itself.”102  As true as that may be in some contexts,103 
to cite that concept here only indicates that the defendant’s 
connection to the shooting has not been established, but that 
simply does not matter. 
Indeed, the court’s discussion is also noteworthy for what is 
never said.  The Illinois accountability statute is taken virtually 
verbatim from the Code, which requires that someone 
intentionally assist another in the commission of a crime.  Yet, 
despite the obvious culpability requirement for accomplice 
liability, the court said absolutely nothing about defendant’s 
mental state. 
In the plainest sense, accountability is established when 
someone has helped another to commit a crime.  But there was 
absolutely no discussion of how Cooper helped the others 
whereby we could conclude that he should be liable for their 
conduct.  Instead, speaking in the broadest—and vaguest—
language, the court found guilt based on presence and 
misconduct in this admittedly loathsome display of gang 
behavior.104  And yet, the crime of which Cooper was convicted 
was not “gang behavior.” 
 
101 Id. at 43 (“[S]uch evidence sufficiently demonstrated a common design and a 
community of unlawful purpose between the defendant and the unknown 
assailant.”).  
102 Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908, 924 (Ill. 1995)). 
103 As with someone who participated in the planning of a crime, or played a 
major role in an early stage of a criminal enterprise. 
104 See Cooper, 743 N.E.2d at 43–44. 
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Cooper was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm.105  
That was the sole crime committed by anyone who was party to 
this encounter.  But it was not clear at all whether an aggravated 
battery was even committed.  Whereas common design had been 
used to link a defendant guilty of one offense to a subsequent 
one, its usage here stretched this doctrine beyond its initial 
contours.  In the absence of any first crime, mere presence at this 
dreadful spectacle sufficed for allegiance to some form of group-
held common design.  Though Kessler was at least proved guilty 
of the burglary, here no criminal conduct at all was proven; 
presence alone sufficed. 
It is hard to deny the pro-prosecution flavor of this doctrine 
and the zeal with which courts have favored it.  The traditional 
arguments made by the defense, rooted in doctrine, have been 
swept aside in favor of an impermissibly broad definition of 
conduct, and in particular, one favoring presence at a criminal 
event.  Why is that?  How has criminal law evolved to the point 
at which clear statutory mandates have been ignored and 
effectively replaced by conflicting ones that repudiate them? 
C. The Politics of Criminal Law Reform 
Scholarly discussion often seems to proceed from the 
unspoken premise that bad law will be recognized as such and 
will somehow virtually self-correct.  Naturally, no such thing 
happens.  In fact, criminal law is far less amenable to that myth 
of spontaneous change than other areas of law because of some 
serious built-in problems.  As the late Bill Stuntz has observed, 
several forces make substantive change difficult here. 
First, whereas natural lobbies exist to oversee and propose 
changes in some areas of law, “for most of criminal law, no 
private intermediaries are well positioned to monitor the law’s 
content and mobilize interested voters on one or another side of 
contested issues.”106  The Model Penal Code was a spectacular 
achievement but was driven by the backing of the American Law 
 
105 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4.2 (West 1993) (repealed 2011), 
available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=095-0236 
(“A person commits aggravated battery with a firearm when he, in committing a 
battery, knowingly or intentionally by means of the discharging of a firearm 
(1) causes any injury to another person . . . .”). 
106 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 529 (2001). 
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Institute and the high profile and prestige of its members.  
Criminal law currently commands no such support.  To the 
extent that states have enacted changes over the years since 
widespread Code enactments, these changes have cluttered 
codes, distorted meanings with inconsistent usage and generally 
attached themselves to each once-new code like “barnacles 
collecting on the hull of a ship.”107  Simply put, interest in 
criminal law reform commands little attention outside of a small 
circle of passionate parties who often appear to be talking only to 
one another.108 
Beyond that, powerful political forces drive changes, many of 
which are unwelcome, to the substantive law.  Criminal law is an 
obvious hot-button area, and stories of atrocities and seemingly-
too-lax standards litter the news on a daily basis.  On the 
superficial level, conventional politics drive changes, often 
following the ebb and flow of crime rates, especially violent 
crime.109  But, as Stuntz observed, a deeper politics, one endemic 
to this area, drives changes much more powerfully and 
predictably. 
These deeper politics consist of what Stuntz called the 
politics of “institutional design and incentives.”110  In a complex 
argument, he showed the dominance of prosecutors in criminal 
law development, and the natural tendency of that development 
to push toward broader rules of liability and harsher sentences.111  
If Stuntz is right, and I think he is, it is easy to account for the 
appeal of common design:  It provides the optimal mechanism 
whereby people are convicted at lowest institutional costs and 
with greatest ease.  However, this perverse doctrine has drawn 
attention even outside of this small circle of cognoscenti, and has 
received the attention of not one, but two, law reform 
commissions. 
 
107 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 88, at 172. 
108 As Stuntz has said, “[c]riminal law scholars may be talking to each other 
(and to a few judges), but they do not appear to be talking to anyone else.” Stuntz, 
supra note 106, at 508 (citation omitted). 
109 Id. at 510. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. Though Stuntz saw the waning of the “tough-on-crime” sentiment, he also 
saw no letup in the deeper politics, which pushed to make “criminal law both larger 
and less relevant.” Id. 
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D. The Progress of Criminal Law Reform 
Law and order advocates frequently proclaim their 
allegiance to the rule of law.  Presumably, that provides the 
normative content for the positions they espouse.  However, 
taking inventory of their requirements for guilt often produces a 
healthy skepticism about their sincerity. 
As state before, crime is a compound concept, requiring proof 
of proscribed conduct with the requisite mental state.112  
Complicity law, by its very nature, provides a mechanism 
whereby guilt attaches to those less involved in the crime than 
the principal actor.  Because of these principles, and because of 
the frequently murky involvement of the accomplice, we would 
naturally expect the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to be 
honored here, as the potential for wrongful conviction is often so 
great.  It would seem odd to protect the principal—someone 
arguably more blameworthy—with the full panoply of rights, 
while neglecting to protect the accomplice similarly.  “Natural 
and probable” turns “logic and expectations” on its head. 
First, as implemented, the doctrine dispenses with the 
requirement for a criminal act related to the target offense, as 
involvement in the prior venture suffices.  Indeed, though 
complicity statutes explicitly require proof of criminal conduct, 
cases like Kessler shunt that proof aside as an annoying 
inconvenience.113  Moreover, decades later, in cases such as 
Cooper, the requirement for involvement in a prior crime was 
dropped, wherein the defendant’s “voluntary attachment” to a 
gang provided the predicate for liability for any gang-related 
crimes.114  Thus, this doctrine abrogates the bedrock doctrine 
requiring a personal actus reus for guilt. 
But it gets worse.  Proof of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
requires the prosecution to prove both the conduct and the 
requisite mental state.  This is not mere hornbook doctrine, but it 
is doctrine embodied in both the Model Penal Code and codes 
such as Illinois’ that have adopted that.  Thus, the Illinois code 
rejects the notion of strict liability, requiring proof of mental 
states unless the offense “clearly indicates a legislative purpose 
 
112 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
113 Recall that the Kessler court interpreted conduct to consist of all acts of the 
principal actor, thus providing for the open-ended liability of the accomplice. See 
People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. 1974). 
114 See People v. Cooper, 743 N.E. 2d 32, 42–43 (Ill. 2000). 
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to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.”115  Beyond 
that, so critical is mens rea to guilt, that the statute elsewhere 
requires that “[a] person is not guilty of an offense, other than an 
offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to 
each element [of] . . . the offense, he acts while having one of the 
mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7.”116 
This is significant for several reasons.  First, it clearly rejects 
the idea of strict liability except in unusual cases.  Second, it 
even rejects the notion that negligence can support guilt where 
the statute is silent, as the sections referred to define intent, 
knowledge, and recklessness, but not negligence.  Thus, in 
Kessler, for example, whereas the state had to prove that his 
cohorts intended to kill the bartender and police officer, Kessler 
was convicted utterly without proof of mental state at all.  The 
rule of law has not simply been ignored; it has been eviscerated. 
Again, Professor Stuntz warned: “[t]he system by which we 
make criminal law has produced not the rule of law but its 
opposite.  And the doctrines that aim to reinforce the rule of law 
only add to the lawlessness.”117  But criminal law creation does 
not take place wholly unchecked.  For example, the state of 
Illinois adopted major provisions of the Code a year before its 
official promulgation.  Moreover, not only did it benefit from the 
decade-long work of that group, but the state also assigned the 
task of code creation to its own distinguished group.118 
Yet time passed, and roughly forty years after the Code’s 
adoption, it had become so swollen with amendments and other 
“barnacles” that then Governor George H. Ryan appointed a 
commission to study the code and recommend all necessary 
changes.119  Governor Ryan was aware of this degradation of the 
 
115 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-9 (West 2012). 
116 Id. at 5/4-3. 
117 Stuntz, supra note 106, at 599. Sadly, so convinced was Professor Stuntz of 
the intractability of this problem, he proposed the use of the rule of lenity, the 
vagueness doctrine, and the ban on retroactive crime definition as the only viable 
safeguards against this encroaching lawlessness. See id. 
118 At the urging of the state Supreme Court and the Governor, the Chicago and 
Illinois State bar associations established a joint committee in 1954 to work on 
revising the criminal code. The joint committee completed its work in 1960, and it 
was approved by the state legislature in 1961, taking effect the following January. 
JOHN F. DECKER & CHRISTOPHER KOPACZ, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF 
CRIMES AND DEFENSES Ch. 1, § 1.01 (5th ed. 2012). 
119 In length alone, the code had increased from the seventy-two pages originally 
enacted to over 1,200 at that time. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at v. Thus, Governor 
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code—as well as unfortunate parallel developments in common 
law—commenting specifically on the fact that “penalties are 
disproportionate to the harm involved or in comparison to other 
offenses, major criminal offenses are defined outside the 
Criminal Code, and many important common-law rules remain in 
force but uncodified.”120 
Two years after the commission’s creation, it produced a 
report spanning over 600 pages.121  That report, particularly 
sensitive to culpability requirements and obviously troubled by 
common design’s rejection of mens rea, explicitly recommended 
the “[e]limination of the ‘[c]ommon [d]esign’ [r]ule for [c]omplicity 
[l]iability.”122  But that was only the consensus opinion of the 
commission members.  A clear rift existed within the commission, 
and Robinson provided commentary to explain the recommended 
position:   
  Issue: Should the Proposed Code incorporate the common-
law “common-design” rule, which imposes complicity liability for 
all crimes in furtherance of a common criminal design or 
agreement on all parties to the agreement, whether or not they 
foresaw, knew about, or ratified those crimes? 
  Yes: The common-design rule makes it easier to convict an 
offender’s confederates without a complex and difficult 
evidentiary showing of culpability. 
  No: The common-design rule inappropriately allows for 
liability based on negligence, or even in the absence of 
culpability as to the offense.  The original 1961 Code sought to 
eliminate the common-design rule, which was then resurrected 
in case law.  To the extent such a complicity rule is considered 
 
Ryan created the Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission, Chaired by 
Matthew Bettenhausen, with special counsel Wayne R. LaFave and Andrew D. 
Leipold, and with many varied and distinguished members. Id. Perhaps most 
significantly, Paul H. Robinson served as the commission’s Reporter and put in 
literally thousands of hours of work for the commission. Id. at iii–iv. 
120 Id. at iv. 
121 See id. at v. 
122 Id. at lvi–lviii. Indeed, noting that “the Illinois courts have resurrected a 
common law rule of accountability for which there is no statutory authority,” the 
report went on to note a remarkable anomaly created by that rule: as “a person may 
be found liable as an accomplice even where, based on his lack of culpability, he 
would have no liability if he himself had personally committed the crime.” Id. at lvii. 
Moreover, the very committee appointed to create the 1961 code stated that “liability 
under this subsection requires proof on an ‘intent to promote or 
facilitate . . . commission’ of the substantive offense.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-
2 cmt. (West 1993). 
FINAL_HEYMAN 12/11/2013  3:33 PM 
156 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:129   
necessary or desirable in the homicide context, it can be 
addressed directly through a felony-murder rule. 
  Reporter: Strongly recommends against expanding liability 
beyond the current complicity provision.123 
In that final report, then, the commission strengthened the 
section on complicity.  Whereas the statute only spoke in terms of 
someone intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the 
offense,124 the commission report provided ultimate clarity 
regarding the requisite mental state.  Thus, proposed section 301 
stated that one is accountable for the conduct of another if, 
“having the culpability required by the offense, he intentionally 
aids, solicits, or conspires with such other person in the planning 
or commission of the offense . . . .”125  The mental state for the 
offense had to be the same for the principal actor and accomplice 
alike. 
Unfortunately, the achievements of that commission were 
short-lived.  Shortly after the report was published, Governor 
Ryan left the office in disgrace, which left no one to shepherd a 
new code through the state legislature.126  What followed only 
seems to confirm Professor Stuntz’s dour vision of the progress of 
criminal law. 
Another law reform commission emerged in 2005, seemingly 
with the same ambition as the earlier one.  The group, known as 
the CLEAR Initiative, established an objective to rid the code of 
its “redundancies, inconsistencies and confusing language” and to 
generally improve a code that had become unwieldy over the 
years, often producing unjust results.127  Chaired by former 
Governor James Thompson, it shared only one member from the 
prior commission, DuPage County Prosecutor Joseph E. Birkett, 
a member who had dissented from some of the ambitions of the 
 
123 FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 19, n.1. 
124 The Model Penal Code, like the Illinois code, is slightly ambiguous about the 
mental state for complicity, providing for intentional assistance, but not specifically 
stating what the accompanying mental state must be. 
125 FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 19 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
126 Governor Ryan was involved in a scandal dating back to his days as 
Secretary of State. He was found guilty on twenty counts in a trial concluding on 
April 17, 2006 and is currently in prison. Monica Davey & Gretchen Ruethling, 
Former Illinois Governor Is Convicted in Graft Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/18/us/18ryan.html?_r=2&ref=georgeryan&. 
127 CLEAR INITIATIVE, http://www.clearinitiative.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
An obvious acronym, CLEAR stands for Criminal Law Edit, Allignment and Reform. 
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earlier commission.128  Touting its allegiance to the Principle of 
Legality, it did little but codify the notion of common design, 
placing it side-by-side with the obviously conflicting Model Penal 
Code counterpart.129 
Having discussed this failure elsewhere, there is no need to 
revisit this sorry effort further.130  The natural and probable 
consequences doctrine—here designated common design—simply 
extends an already attenuated principle of liability beyond the 
breaking point.  But the very existence of this extreme doctrine 
owes to the ambivalence surrounding accomplice liability 
generally.  Ill-conceived, it is nonetheless an understandable 
outgrowth of a principle of liability closely tied to agency 
principles, thus often dissociated from concepts of fault. 
German law and the common law predicated liability on 
party status.  The Model Penal Code swept that aside, but that 
simplification carried its own problems, throwing into question 
the very basis for accomplice liability.  Scholars, then, strive to 
derive some grand theory of accomplice liability.  But any grand 
theory here must fail, and the very quest for one loses sight of 
some fundamental objectives of the criminal law. 
 
 
128 See Letter from Joseph E. Birkett to Paul H. Robinson (Oct. 24, 2000) (on file 
with the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission Staff) (resisting 
any major rewrite of the code). 
129 See generally Heyman, supra note 8.  
An essential feature of a criminal code is the Principle of Legality, which 
requires that penal law should give notice to the citizenry as to what 
conduct is proscribed as well as provide an ascertainable standard of guilt 
to those who have enforcement responsibilities, such as police, prosecutors, 
judges and juries.  
John Decker, The Mission of the Criminal Law Edit, Alignment, and Reform 
Commission (CLEAR): An Introductory Commentary, 41 J. MARSHALL L.REV. 611, 
657–58 (2008) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). Professor Decker was the 
Special Advisor to the CLEAR Initiative. 
That this mirrors the sentiments of the prior commission is a sad irony, given the 
clear departure of the latter group from this principle in its codification of common 
design. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2. 
130 See Heyman, supra note 8, at 390–91. Indeed, CLEAR’s failure was not lost 
on Robinson. When I contacted him about the codification of common design, he 
seemed resigned, telling me that it came as no surprise, as “that is exactly what you 
should expect from that crowd.” E-Mail from Paul H. Robinson to Michael G. 
Heyman (May 6, 2010) (on file with author). 
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III. COMPLICITY LAW: THE SETTING 
Complicity law is troubling.  Reading the tale our youthful 
translator, we chafe at the idea of imposing liability for 
potentially slight, impromptu assistance—worse, because of the 
offense, he faced a mandatory ten-year sentence.  Yet, we also 
recognize that some criminal acts either require joint efforts or in 
fact result from such contributions of one sort or another.  There, 
the very notions of principal and accomplice blur, and we begin to 
see the merit of the German system, differentiating as it does 
among a variety of types of actors.  In that, it resists the binary 
choice of our system of either guilty or not guilty with potentially 
identical punishments.  Unfortunately, the very emergence of the 
notion of Tatherrschaft demonstrates the flaws of that scheme.  
Moreover, that concept itself, as previously mentioned has been 
further refined, thus underscoring its inadequacy as an all-
embracing theory. 
The strength of any theory lies in its ability to successfully 
address hard cases.  The easy ones are readily handled.  For 
example, apparently the Code decided to address the Othello 
situation by including the notion of “provoking” one to commit a 
crime.  That is, because of the slight inaccuracy of characterizing 
Iago’s conduct through other terms, provocation seemed more 
appropriate.  However, those involved settled on “encourage,” as 
it seemed adequately broad to cover a variety of acts.131  But that 
is an easy case.  The harder cases can involve multiple parties, a 
variety of types of contributions, and varying degrees of 
commitment to the criminal enterprise. 
 
131 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART I §§ 3.01 to 5.07, § 5.02 at 
372 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1985) (“Encouragement also covers 
forms of communication designed to lead the recipient to act criminally, even if the 
message is not as direct as a command or request. Whether one can ‘encourage’ 
without communicating a desire that a crime be committed may be more arguable, 
but the term is probably broad enough to cover such cases as well if a criminal 
purpose exists.”). Indeed, Professor Kadish discussed Othello on numerous 
occasions, concluding, “there is no reason why Iago should not be held accountable as 
Othello’s accessory.” Kadish, supra note 1, at 365. It should be noted that this is the 
Commentary to section 5.02, dealing with solicitation to commit a crime. The Model 
Penal Code explicitly uses the term “encourages,” the subject of this debate: 
A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of 
promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or 
requests another person to engage in specific conduct that would constitute 
such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or would establish his 
complicity in its commission or attempted commission. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 (2011). 
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Take newly minted parolee Danny Ocean, from the movie 
Ocean’s Eleven, who sought revenge against the man who was 
dating his ex-wife.132  Danny developed a plan to steal a hundred-
and-fifty-million dollars from the vault housing the monies from 
the three casinos owned by his ex-wife’s boyfriend.  He first hired 
a blackjack dealer, Frank Catton, and then reunited with Rusty 
Ryan, who became his right-hand man, helping him to devise the 
scheme and recruit the appropriate personnel. 
The personnel consisted of a wealthy financier, Reuben 
Tishkoff, who, at first, reluctantly agreed to bankroll the venture; 
an electronics expert, Livingston Dell; a demolitions man, Basher 
Tarr; a savvy old-timer, Saul Bloom; the Malloy Brothers, the 
pickpocket, Linus Caldwell; and, perhaps most important, a 
“grease man” named Yen.133  In a wildly detailed plan, Danny 
and Rusty set out, through brains and guile, to build an exact 
replica of the vault, forward a video of that replica to security to 
create a sense of well being, black out the city, and, through 
other pyrotechnics, to pull off the heist. 
Every member played an indispensible role, though only 
three entered the vault itself: Danny, Linus and Yen.  Every 
member was aware of all details of the plan, though Danny 
concealed his true motive of revenge from them.  Also, though all 
did something indispensible, the form of the contributions 
differed greatly, as did the relationship of each to the gang and 
one another.  Naturally, their commitments to the venture 
differed too, as they were in it for different reasons, though all 
seemed to genuinely relish the challenge of the plan. 
 
 
132 This account is taken from the synopsis at the IMDB website. Synopsis for 
Ocean’s Eleven, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0240772/synopsis (last visited 
Jun. 29, 2013). 
133 Yen could be described as 
a 95 pound ‘little Chinese guy’, who worked as an acrobat in a Las Vegas 
show. He was so flexible that he could fold in half and fit in a very small 
tube in a portable safe. At the time of the robbery this is how he got into 
the vault of the casino. He got in, and therefore they called him the 
greaseman. 
Urban Dictionary: greaseman, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/ 
define.php?term=greaseman (last visited Jun. 29, 2013). 
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A. Dominant Justifications for Accomplice Liability 
Though a comparatively neglected topic, discussions of 
accomplice liability have clustered about two central concepts: 
act dominion and causation.  In a major piece, Professor Kadish 
tried to explain why causation should play no role at all.  
Eschewing the analogy to a mechanical system, Kadish explained 
the difference between human actions and non-willed events:  “In 
a word, every volitional actor is a wild card; he need never act in 
a certain way. . . . Since an individual could always have chosen 
to act without the influence, it is always possible that he might 
have.  No laws of nature can settle the issue.”134  Thus, though 
Kadish embraced the notion that people “influence” others,135 he 
saw the criminal actor as a free moral agent, one who bore sole 
causal responsibility for her choices. 
But is that right?  Kadish focused on the decision to commit 
the crime, seeing no other role for causation in that universe of 
conduct.  But don’t the contributions of others play different and 
substantial roles, culminating in the criminal conduct itself?  
German theorists, refining the notion of Tatherrschaft, 
recognized that it naturally subdivided into several categories, 
among which was Willensherrschaft, control over the volitional 
controls of another.  By narrowly focusing on only this aspect of 
causation, Kadish lost sight of the variety of ways people 
contribute to ultimate outcomes.136 
In Ocean’s Eleven, Danny went to see Reuben for money to 
bankroll the criminal venture.  Indeed, because of the complexity 
of the scheme, the cost was undoubtedly enormous.  But without 
that backing, the job could never have been pulled.  Reuben had 
absolutely no control over the plans and only contributed the 
financial wherewithal for the crime.  By Kadish’s thinking, he 
played no role in causing that conduct.  Of course he did.  That 
money was indispensible to the crime and played a role, along 
with a host of other factors. in bringing it about. 
Because of that backing, Danny could attract the personnel 
he did and bring his grand scheme to fruition.  Indeed, that 
backing provided comfort and supplies to the gang that led 
directly to their criminal success.  Reacting against Kadish’s 
 
134 Kadish, supra note 1, at 360. 
135 Id. at 343. 
136 See supra text accompanying note 58. 
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narrow view, Dressler tried to revamp the theoretical 
underpinnings for complicity.137  Tracking some of our intuitions, 
his approach seeks to mete out punishment proportionally to the 
harm people cause.138  This operates in two ways.  Since he who 
causes the harm has created social harm, he should receive 
substantial punishment.  However, the accomplice who lends 
non-causal assistance should, then, receive less punishment as, 
though the involvement is there, the harm is not.  Taking this a 
step further, Dressler even provided sample statutes that 
captured this distinction.139 
But this is too neat a distinction.  Every member of Ocean’s 
Eleven helped produce the result, though not in the sense of 
human agency advanced by Kadish.140  All parties were entirely 
interdependent, thus bringing about the final result.  They 
caused it as surely as did Danny and Linus, by rappelling into 
the vault, as did Yen, by folding himself in half to occupy a tiny 
space, as did the technical accomplices and, of course, the 
redoubtable Reuben and Saul.  In fact, had Danny not been at 
the crime site, there is still no doubt that we would regard him as 
the dominant figure in this gang, though he would then be acting 
only in an accomplice capacity. 
We would regard him as the overwhelmingly dominant 
figure because he interacted with everyone, conceived the plan, 
assembled the personnel, and was most deeply committed to its 
success at every point.  This sort of group dynamic has not gone 
unnoticed, as Dressler has retreated somewhat from his 
causation approach in recent years.  Most recently, he tried to 
balance these two dominant themes of act hegemony and 
causation.  Thus, he proposes that “[a] person is not accountable 
for the actions of the perpetrator unless her assistance not only 
 
137 See Dressler, supra note 32, at 92–93 n.2. 
138 Id. at 130. 
139 First, he provided: “A person is guilty of any offense specified in this Code if, 
acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, 
he causes the harm specified by the offense to be committed by another.” Then, 
dealing with the non-causal accomplice: “A person is guilty of the offense of 
Noncausal Assistance if, acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the 
commission of another offense: . . . he purposely assists, or influences another, in the 
commission of other [sic] offense . . . . ” Id. at 138. 
140 That is, though it is not clear how the mere accomplices convinced the 
principals to commit the criminal act of stealing from the vault. But the question 
seems trivial, as the assembled group was completely interdependent, success 
depending on the successful operation of the various role players. 
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satisfies the causation requirement but there is evidence that the 
accomplice was a substantial participant, not a bit player, in the 
multi-party crime.”141  But that verges on tautology, as it 
provides no standard for finding causal contribution or major 
party status.  Virtually conceding this, he further elaborated that 
the “best reform” may consist of drawing distinctions on the basis 
of “the substantiality of the actor’s participation.”142  By that 
view, the minor participant should only be guilty of a lesser 
crime, whatever that might be.143 
Sometimes there are lesser crimes.  In some areas, specific 
substantive laws have been passed that address the liability of 
those in foreseeable chains of criminal wrongdoing.  Thus, for 
example, laws prohibiting the sale of handguns to minors aim to 
punish those who facilitate offenses by young, impulsive 
wrongdoers.144  Unfortunately, since the range of assistance is 
almost unimaginably varied, this simply cannot work on any 
meaningful scale, as that would require an impossibly complex 
reconceptualization of all crimes.  How would we treat the 
various members of Danny’s group?  How could those types of 
contributions possibly be identified and categorized?  And that 
approach would also be in tension with our fundamental 
intuitions that some forms of aid are so major, their effects so 
profound, that the actors simply must receive substantial 
punishment, though technically they are only accomplices.  The 
punishment should fit the crime, and the crime is the one 
assisted. 
New York departs from the view that accomplice liability 
should be structured to fit the crime, at least in part.  Instead, 
codifying the notion of criminal facilitator, it somewhat 
uncouples liability from the target offense, thus creating four 
levels of facilitators.145  Resembling the German approach, it 
predicates liability on the age of the perpetrator, the age of the  
 
 
141 Dressler, supra note 14, at 447. 
142 Id. at 448. 
143 Id. 
144 See Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 
270–271 (2000). In fact, Weisberg points out this alternative to reformulating 
notions of the bases for accomplice liability. Id. 
145 These provisions are in addition to New York complicity law, which takes 
rather traditional form. 
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facilitator, and the gravity of the target offense.146  Thus, for 
example, the most serious crime is facilitation in the first degree, 
defined as: 
[a] person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the first degree 
when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person 
under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct 
that would constitute a class A felony, he, being over eighteen 
years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person 
with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and 
which in fact aids such person to commit such a class A 
felony.147 
Having the clear virtue of expanding that binary universe of 
accomplice-like liability, it avoids the trying metaphysics of some 
theories, instead basing liability on the youth of the perpetrator 
and the efficacy of the assistance provided.  But that may 
exhaust its virtues.  Focusing on the conduct feature, it limits 
liability to those things that provide “means or opportunity” 
only.148  How, or whether, that could address some of the 
characters in Ocean’s Eleven, our young translator, or jazz 
aficionado of the Hawkins case is unclear.  Thus, its relationship 
to New York’s general complicity law becomes unclear as well.149 
New York’s culpability features are even stranger.  Hinging 
liability on the actor’s belief that she is probably rendering 
assistance to another, it specifies neither knowledge nor 
recklessness, thus leaving culpability unacceptably vague.  
Moreover, the facilitator need not have the mental state for the 
commission of the target offense, thus further distancing him 
from this event.150  So, it would seem that the assistance itself is 
the gravamen of the offense.  Unfortunately, the commentary on 
that section suggests otherwise:  “In fact, the conduct of the 
facilitator will be generally ‘confined to preparation so attenuated 
 
146 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.08 (McKinney 2012). 
147 Id. Criminal facilitation in the first degree is a Class B felony, one step down 
from the assisted crime. 
148 Id. 
149 New York’s general complicity law states: “When one person engages in 
conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such 
conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission 
thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such 
person to engage in such conduct.” Id. § 20.00. 
150 The scheme provides no defense even if “[t]he defendant himself is not guilty 
of the felony which he facilitated because he did not act with the intent or other 
culpable mental state required for the commission thereof.” Id. § 115.10. 
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from the final stages that the role of the facilitator is only 
remotely related as a cause or contributor to the ultimate 
crime.’ ”151  Accordingly, this approach fails, at least as 
implemented, as an alternative or addition to general complicity 
law.152 
The failure of these alternatives does not reveal the 
intractability of the problem, but may, on closer examination, 
signal the presence of a pseudo-problem.  Ocean’s Eleven 
demonstrates the remarkable breadth of assistance possible in a 
multi-party venture.153  Causation, depth of commitment, and act 
dominion provide fine abstractions, but break down as ineffective 
tools for carefully calibrating blame and punishment.  They 
simply cannot work with optimal precision.  But does the Code’s 
approach, sweeping though it is, really fail to provide an 
adequate legal standard for accomplice liability? 
IV. JUST DESERTS AND THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PUNISHING 
ACCOMPLICES 
The failures of the New York approach, of specific assistance 
statutes, and of any grand theory are of a piece:  Each attempts 
to deal with the infinite variability of human conduct by reducing 
it to some common features and apportioning blame accordingly.  
Each envisions some rule that captures this infinite variety of 
conduct, reducing that to manageable categories.  The Code takes 
a different approach, as its operative conduct consists of “aid” or 
“agreement” to aid in the planning or commission of the offense.  
Rejecting some rule or set of rules, the Code instead opted for a 
broad standard for determining accountability.  Effectively 
rejecting the objective of somehow finding a perfect rule of 
complicity, it recognizes the real-world limitations of that ideal. 
 
151 William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00, at 106 
(quoting People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 495, 501, 298 N.E. 2d 
647, 651, (1973)). The model jury instructions for this section provide little guidance, 
as they only require the jury to find that the facilitator “was rendering aid” and that 
the conduct “in fact aided” the principal actor. CJI2d[N.Y.] PL 115, 
http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/2-PenalLaw/115/115-08.pdf.  
152 Robert Weisberg reached a similar conclusion, recognizing that because of 
internal definitional issues and “ill-coordination with complicity laws more 
generally, they cannot avoid the perennial problems of complicity law.” Weisberg, 
supra note 144, at 270. 
153 Indeed, not to court the precious, but the last installment in this area was 
Ocean’s Thirteen in 2007, thus adding to the complexity. 
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The Code’s beauty lies in the very generality of its language.  
Essentially embodying a standard for accomplice liability, it 
avoids the pitfalls of yielding to any constricting rules, which 
distinguishes it from less successful efforts.154 
Moreover, the Code’s scrupulous adherence to culpability 
principles assuages fears of potential injustice and uncertainty.  
To be an accomplice, one must intentionally aid another in the 
commission of the offense.155  Beyond that, one must do so with 
the mens rea for the target offense.  These requirements achieve 
two critical objectives:  They help determine the commitment of 
the actor to the venture and prevent the conviction of the 
indifferent companion. 
Perhaps the young translator was, indeed, that indifferent 
companion.  As Kadish demonstrated, under the Code approach 
he should not be convicted absent a showing of conduct on his 
part intended to further the drug offense.156  Likewise, the 
attendee at the jazz concert in London should not have been 
convicted as an accomplice to Hawkins because he did not assist 
him in committing the immigration violation and the prosecution 
has the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Fortunately, though, Danny’s full complement of helpers 
would be convicted, as, by hypothesis, they all knew of the plan, 
its objective, and their interdependence in the commission of the 
theft—and pursued it with uncommon dedication.  And yet, we 
recoil somewhat at the notion of lumping them together, 
particularly because their roles differed so substantially.  Danny 
was the obvious kingpin, but some, like Yen, were, in Dressler’s 
language, bit players. 
 
 
154 Professor Pierre Schlag cleverly avoided buying into any static notion of 
these concepts. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
379 (1985). Schlag recounts a pithy distinction between the two, involving the 
obligations of drivers at railroad crossings. Whereas Holmes offered the rule that the 
driver must stop, look and listen, Cardozo instead suggested that the actor proceed 
with reasonable caution. Id. Though too much can be made of the differences 
between these legal tools, standards seem to afford a flexibility not readily shared 
with rules. Conversely, rules seem to provide a certainty fitting for criminal law. 
155 Recognizing the breadth of the notions of assistance and influence, Kadish 
pointed out that they could encompass meanings such as: advise, persuade, 
command, encourage, induce, procure, instigate, or solicit. Kadish, supra note 1, at 
343. 
156 See id. 
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We recoil for the wrong reasons.  Our discomfort results from 
thinking in causal terms, and for instinctively predicating guilt 
on causal contribution to the result.  Perhaps results do not 
matter. 
A. Lessons from the Field: Insights from Social Psychology and 
Penology 
In the summer of 1971, Philip Zimbardo launched a program 
known as the Stanford Prison Experiment.157  Working with 
students in his summer course on the psychology of 
imprisonment, he established a simulated prison setting at 
Stanford, including guards and prisoners who were students in 
the course.158  The results were stunning and horrifying.  Within 
six days, he terminated the project “because it was running out of 
control.”159  Reminiscent of Lord of the Flies, the guards were 
abusing the prisoners so badly that the psychological damage 
was staggering. 
From this and similar situations, Zimbardo learned of the 
“pervasive yet subtle power of a host of situational variables 
[that] dominate an individual’s will to resist.”160  Good people can 
engage in evil conduct as a result of the forces of 
“deindividuation, obedience to authority, passivity in the face of 
threats, self-justification, and rationalization.”161  According to 
Zimbardo, this convincing explains the atrocities at Abu Ghraib 
as well as other shameful uses of power over others.162 
But explanation is not to be confused with excuse.  Though 
discussing this banality of evil, Zimbardo did not excuse such 
actions, but rather, praised those who resisted these pernicious 
forces.163  Similarly, those who commit crimes with others are not 
to be forgiven despite these powerful social forces that influence 
 
157 PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD 
PEOPLE TURN EVIL 1920 (2007). 
158 See id. 
159 Philip G. Zimbardo, Revisiting the Stanford Prison Experiment: A Lesson in 
the Power of Situation, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 30, 2007, at B6. 
Zimbardo reported that “[b]y [d]ay 5, five of the student prisoners [had] to be 
released early because of extreme stress.” Id. In the same vein, most of the 
remaining students “[adopted] a zombielike attitude and posture, totally obedient to 
escalating guard demands.” Id. 
160 ZIMBARDO, supra note 157, at xii. 
161 Id. 
162 See id. 
163 Inverting things, he also spoke of the “banality of heroism.” Id. at 21. 
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behavior.  Indeed, those selfsame forces create an environment 
conducive to criminality and violence, and those who participate 
freely have chosen that environment as theirs.  Having created 
that environment, they have thus increased the likelihood of 
crime and must accept punishment accordingly. 
Those who seek the perfect test for complicity may have lost 
sight of just what they are seeking.  Likewise, this Article noted 
the extraordinary use of interpretation and the power 
represented by criminal law.164  Punishing serious violations of 
our norms, criminal law determines whether and to what extent 
certain people should be punished.  The Code emphasizes 
culpability as the touchstone, as do many current thinkers. 
This approach recognizes risk creation as the basis for the 
criminal sanction.  It considers “an actor deserving of punishment 
when he violates these norms that forbid the unjustified harming 
of, or risking harm to, others—that is, failing to give others’ 
interests their proper weight.”165  That is why we punish:  
Inherent in that choice to do something wrong is the choice to 
devalue others as well as the norms that should bind.  
Conversely, just as some should receive the punishments they 
deserve, they should receive no more than that, or none at all, if 
they have not made such choices.166  This focus explains the 
appropriate antipathy toward laws that penalize the indifferent 
actor, the person only tenuously connected to the wrongdoing.167 
 
 
164 Id. at 6. 
165 LARRY ALEXANDER, ET AL., CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 6 (2009). Stephen Morse, also a psychologist, recognized that “[i]t is simply a 
fact about human beings that potential encouragement or aid in principle increases 
the risk that the recipient will commit the act aided or encouraged.” Stephen J. 
Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 398 (2004). 
As he said, this is simply “how the world works.” Id.  
166 As Alexander said, “unperceived risks do not affect the actor’s culpability.” 
ALEXANDER, ET AL., supra note 165, at 18. An argument against negligence, it is, a 
fortiori, one against liability without any risk creation at all. 
167 Some commentators have tried to make sense of various theories of 
inculpation without culpability. For example, Paul Robinson wrote a piece in which 
he isolated four such theories across a wide range of crimes, accepting some, while 
rejecting others. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 
YALE L.J. 609 (1984). By contrast, Mark Noferi constructed a due process check on 
such imputation, particularly in the Pinkerton setting. See generally Mark Noferi, 
Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due Process Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability, 
33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91 (2006). 
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This unswerving focus on culpability solves many problems.  
It justifies the conviction of Ocean’s Eleven, while questioning 
that of others discussed here.  It supports the Code’s general 
theory of complicity, meting out punishment proportionally with 
what people have wrongly done, thus utterly rejecting vicarious 
liability.168  And it argues powerfully against views such as the 
natural and probable doctrine. 
For all the formal objections to natural and probable, the 
most troubling is its rejection of this bedrock concept of personal 
responsibility.169  Rudy Kessler did nothing to warrant a 
conviction of attempted murder.  Similarly, though Marcus 
Cooper “attached himself” to a violent gang, there was no 
showing whatsoever that he committed aggravated battery with 
a firearm.170  Imposition of liability under this doctrine is wholly 
unjustified and affirms Professor Stuntz’s baleful vision of 
criminal justice in America.  In an area itself fraught with 
problems, this doctrine is simply barbaric. 
CONCLUSION 
Dressler proclaimed, “American accomplice law is a 
disgrace.”171  Noting the binary nature of guilt and innocence, 
surely he has a point.  Portraying injustices such as that of the 
young translator, he further established his position.  And 
certainly, he rightly criticized the natural and probable view for 
many of the same reasons expressed here.  But beyond that, it is 
just not that simple. 
 
168 As Professor Morse noted, this “account of accomplice liability focuses 
entirely on the accomplice’s own behavior and suggests that accomplice liability 
should not be derivative.” Morse, supra note 165. However, even though Professor 
Morse is correct that guilt is personal, liability is derivative in the sense that the 
accomplice assumes responsibility for the actus reus of the crime through his own 
culpable participation. 
169 By “formal,” I mean such matters as the statutory factors that bar its 
imposition, its inconsistency with the Code view in states such as Illinois that have 
enacted both, and its obvious subversion of the presumption of innocence and the 
need for proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
170 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Strikingly, the California version 
of this rule assigns responsibility to those who are “concerned in the commission of a 
crime.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 2012). Thus, for example, some defendants who 
had robbed a business were found guilty of subsequent rapes committed, because of 
the “sexual aura” of the business robbed. People v. Nguyen, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323, 332 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
171 Dressler, supra note 14, at 428. 
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Illinois adopted its code over fifty years ago, yet courts 
simply refused to apply it properly.  They ignored it despite 
unambiguous state code commentary, as well as clear language 
from that of the Model Penal Code.  Sadly, this has not been 
simply a local phenomenon, but rather, has occurred countless 
times throughout the country following the Code revolution of the 
1960s and 1970s.  Hardly a pattern restricted to complicity law, 
blatant disregard for the proper administration of the Code may 
nevertheless be most malign here. 
Worse, the forces that shape criminal law cut against the 
grain of sound law reform.  Attacks on the rule of law validate 
Bill Stuntz’s vision of criminal law as an area driven by special 
interests, with no counterbalancing forces at work.172  The results 
truly are pathological, even resulting in codifications that restore 
the inanity of the pre-Code era. 
But academic efforts to rethink complicity law show little 
promise.  There is no need for new statutory law; rather, we must 
recognize the stunning accomplishment of the Code and further 
recognize its sound theoretical underpinnings.  Focusing on risk 
creation, it promotes punishing those who intentionally pursue 
these criminal objectives.  Thus, deflecting the focus to also 
capture notions such as causal contribution, it distorts that very 
focus. 
The natural and probable view is manifestly unjust, but it is 
simply the most extreme example of law losing touch with its 
fundamental objectives.  All aspects of complicity law that are 
similarly adrift should be rejected.  But that requires the will—
perhaps the political will—of those involved to repudiate this 
legal monster that complicity law has become. 
Courts, prosecutors, and legislators have to sincerely pursue 
the rule of law and stop paying it mere lip service.  No magic 
wand can make this happen, nor can any grand theory improve 
upon what we already have.  Rather, the people involved in the 
criminal justice system must stop pursuing what can only be a 
form of blood lust and return to an ideologically neutral law or 
risk losing all sense of just proportion. 
 
 
172 Reviewing Stuntz’s last book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, 
Tracey Meares made a poignant observation: “[I]t is justice that has collapsed, not 
the system that purportedly delivers it.” Tracey L. Meares, Justice Falls Down: 
America’s Flawed Criminal Justice System, HARV. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2012, at 18, 18. 
